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Abstract. We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are
placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mech-
anism maps the agents’ locations to a set of facilities. The agents seek to minimize
their connection cost, namely the distance of their true location to the nearest fa-
cility, and may misreport their location. We are interested in mechanisms that are
strategyproof, i.e., ensure that no agent can benefit from misreporting her loca-
tion, do not resort to monetary transfers, and approximate the optimal social cost.
We focus on the closely related problems of k-Facility Location and Facility Lo-
cation with a uniform facility opening cost, and mostly study winner-imposing
mechanisms, which allocate facilities to the agents and require that each agent
allocated a facility should connect to it. We show that the winner-imposing ver-
sion of the Proportional Mechanism (Lu et al., EC ’10) is stategyproof and 4k-
approximate for the k-Facility Location game. For the Facility Location game, we
show that the winner-imposing version of the randomized algorithm of (Meyer-
son, FOCS ’01), which has an approximation ratio of 8, is strategyproof. Further-
more, we present a deterministic non-imposing group strategyproof O(logn)-
approximate mechanism for the Facility Location game on the line.
1 Introduction
We consider Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a met-
ric space based on the preferences of strategic agents. Such problems are motivated by
natural scenarios in social choice, where the government plans to build a number of
public facilities in an area. The choice of the locations is based on the preferences of
local people, or agents. So each agent reports her ideal location, and the government
applies a mechanism mapping the agents’ preferences to a set of facility locations. The
government’s objective is to minimize the social cost, namely the total distance of the
agents’ locations to the nearest facility plus the construction cost, in case where the
number of facilities is not fixed and may depend on the agents’ preferences. On the
other hand, the agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of
their ideal location to the nearest facility. In fact, an agent may report a false prefer-
ence in an attempt of manipulating the mechanism. Therefore, the mechanism should
be strategyproof, i.e., should ensure that no agent can benefit from misreporting her
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location, or even group strategyproof, i.e., should ensure that for any group of agents
misreporting their locations, at least one of them does not benefit. At the same time, the
mechanism should achieve a reasonable approximation to the optimal social cost.
In this work, we consider two closely related facility location problems, and present
computationally efficient strategyproof approximate mechanisms for both. In the k-
Facility Location game, we place k facilities in a metric space so as to minimize the
agents’ total connection cost. In the Facility Location game, there is a uniform facility
opening cost, instead of a fixed number of facilities, and we place a number of facilities
in a metric space so as to minimize the sum of the agents’ total connection cost and
the total facility opening cost. This problem is motivated by natural scenarios where
the social planner is willing to trade off the agents’ connection cost against its own
construction cost, so that a socially more desirable solution is achieved, and has been
widely used as a natural relaxation of the k-Facility Location problem (see e.g. [6, 14]).
Related Work. The problems of Facility Location and k-Facility Location, a.k.a. k-
Median, are classical and have received considerable attention in Operations Research
(see e.g. [14]), Approximation and Online Algorithms (see e.g. [6, 21, 8, 13, 2]), Social
Choice (see e.g. [16, 5, 22, 15, 20, 4, 9]), and recently, Algorithmic Mechanism Design
(see e.g. [19, 1, 11, 10, 18]). The related work in Social Choice mostly focuses on locat-
ing a single facility on the real line, where the agents’ preferences are single-peaked.
A classical result due to Moulin [16], Barbera` and Jackson [5], and Sprumont [22]
characterizes the class of generalized median voter schemes as the only strategyproof
mechanisms when agents have single-peaked preferences on the line (see also [3, 23]
and [17, Chapter 10]). Schummer and Vohra [20] extended this result to tree metrics,
where the class of extended median voter schemes are the only strategyproof mech-
anisms. On the negative side, Schummer and Vohra proved that for non-tree metrics,
only dictatorial rules can be both strategyproof and onto. The problem of designing
mechanisms with desirable properties for multiple facility location games has also been
considered (see e.g. [15, 4, 9]). This line of work however does not address the issue of
designing strategyproof mechanisms that approximate the optimal social cost.
Our work fits in the framework of approximate mechanism design without money,
recently initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [19]. They suggested that for optimiza-
tion problems, such as 2-Facility Location on the line and 1-Facility Location on non-
tree metrics, where computing the optimal solution is not strategyproof, approximation
can circumvent impossibility results and yield strategyproof mechanisms that do not re-
sort to monetary transfers. Procaccia and Tennenholtz [19] applied this approach to sev-
eral location problems on the real line, and obtained strategyproof approximate mecha-
nisms and lower bounds on the best approximation ratio achievable by a strategyproof
mechanism. For the 2-Facility Location game on the line, they presented a determinis-
tic (n − 1)-approximate mechanism, where n is the number of agents, proved a lower
bound of 3/2 on the approximation ratio of any deterministic strategyproof mechanism,
and conjectured that the lower bound for deterministic mechanisms is Ω(n).
Subsequently, Lu, Wang, and Zhou [11] improved the lower bound for deterministic
mechanisms to 2, established a lower bound of 1.045 for randomized mechanisms, and
presented a simple randomized n/2-approximate mechanism. For locating two facilities
on the line, Lu, Sun, Wang, and Zhu [10] improved the lower bound for deterministic
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mechanisms to (n−1)/2, thus settling the conjecture of [19]. Moreover, they presented
a deterministic (n − 1)-approximate mechanism for locating two facilities on the cir-
cle, and proved that a natural randomized mechanism, the Proportional Mechanism,
is strategyproof and achieves an approximation ratio of 4 for 2-Facility Location on
any metric space. Unfortunately, Lu et al. observed that the Proportional Mechanism is
not strategyproof for more than two facilities. For 1-Facility Location, Alon, Feldman,
Procaccia, and Tennenholtz [1] gave an almost complete characterization of the approx-
imation ratios achievable by randomized and deterministic strategyproof mechanisms.
Following a more general agenda, McSherry and Talwar [12] suggested the use
of differentially private algorithms as almost-strategyproof approximate mechanisms.
Any agent has a limited influence on the outcome of differentially private algorithm,
and thus a limited incentive to lie. McSherry and Talwar presented a general (random-
ized exponential-time) differentially private mechanism that approximates the optimal
social cost within an additive logarithmic term. Subsequently, Gupta et al. [7] presented
computationally efficient differentially private algorithms for several combinatorial op-
timization problems, including (k-)Facility Location.
Building on [12], Nissim, Smorodinsky, and Tennenholtz [18] developed the only
known general technique for the design of strategyproof approximate mechanisms with-
out money. Nissim et al. consider imposing mechanisms, namely mechanisms able to
restrict how agents exploit their outcome. Restricting the set of allowable post-actions
for the agents, the mechanism can penalize liars. For Facility Location games in particu-
lar, an imposing mechanism requires that an agent should connect to the facility nearest
to her reported location, thus increasing her connection cost if she lies. Despite being
stronger, imposing mechanisms do not circumvent the lower bounds of [11]. Nissim
et al. combined the differentially private mechanism of [12] with an imposing mecha-
nism that penalizes lying agents, and obtained a general imposing strategyproof mech-
anism. As a by-product, Nissim et al. obtained a randomized imposing mechanism for
k-Facility Location with a running time exponential in k. The mechanism approximates
the optimal average connection cost, namely the optimal connection cost divided by n,
within an additive term of roughly 1/n1/3. Even though the error term is diminishing
as n grows, it may happen that the optimal average cost decreases much faster. In fact,
for the class of instances in [11, Theorem 3], the optimal average cost is 1/n and the
mechanism’s error is at least 1/n1/3. Thus, the additive approximation guarantee of
[18] does not imply any constant approximation ratio for k-Facility Location.
Contribution. Our work is motivated by the absence of any positive results on the ap-
proximability of multiple facility location games by non-imposing mechanisms, and by
the recent striking result of [18] on their approximability by imposing mechanisms. In
fact, the only work prior to ours that addresses approximate mechanism design for lo-
cation problems with more than two facilities is [18]. Throughout this work, we restrict
our attention to computationally efficient strategyproof mechanisms without money1
and to the standard multiplicative notion of approximation. We suggest two orthogonal
1 We consider the problems of Facility Location and k-Facility Location, with k being part of
the input, which are NP-hard. Thus one cannot directly apply VCG payments (see e.g. [17,
Chapter 9]) and obtain a computationally efficient strategyproof mechanism that minimizes
the social cost.
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ways of relaxing approximate mechanism design for the k-Facility Location game, and
show that both lead to strong positive results.
We mostly consider a natural class of imposing mechanisms, which we call winner-
imposing mechanisms. Such a mechanism operates by allocating facilities to the agents.
If an agent is allocated a facility, the facility is placed to her reported location, and the
agent should connect to it. Agents not allocated a facility connect to the facility closest
to their ideal location. Thus a winner-imposing mechanism penalizes a lying agent only
if she succeeds in manipulating the mechanism. Moreover, the “penalty” a lying agent
receives equals the distance of her ideal location to her misreported location.
In contrast to the observation of [10] that the Proportional Mechanism is not strat-
egyproof for more than two facilities, we prove that its winner-imposing version is
strategyproof for any number of facilities (cf. Lemma 1). Establishing that its approx-
imation ratio is at most 4k (cf. Lemma 2), we obtain a randomized winner-imposing
strategyproof 4k-approximate mechanism for k-Facility Location, for any k.
Next we consider the Lagrangian relaxation of the k-Facility Location game,
namely the Facility Location game with a uniform facility opening cost, instead of a
hard constraint on the number of facilities. In fact, considering the Facility Location
problem as a relaxation of k-Facility Location, a.k.a. k-Median, has been a standard
and quite successful approach in the fields of Operations Research (see e.g. [14]) and
Approximation Algorithms (see e.g. [6, 8]).
For the Facility Location game, we first show that the winner-imposing version
of Meyerson’s randomized algorithm for Facility Location [13] is strategyproof (cf.
Theorem 2). Combining this with [13, Theorem 2.1], we obtain a randomized winner-
imposing strategyproof 8-approximate mechanism for the Facility Location game.
Moreover, we present a deterministic non-imposing mechanism for the Facility Lo-
cation game on the line. The mechanism is based on a hierarchical partitioning of the
line, and is motivated by the online algorithm for Facility Location on the plane by
Anagnostopoulos, Bent, Upfal, and van Hentenryck [2]. We prove that the mechanism
is group strategyproof (cf. Lemma 4) and O(log n)-approximate (cf. Lemma 5). No-
tably, its approximation ratio is exponentially better than the lower bound of [10, The-
orem 3.7] on the best ratio achievable by deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for
the 2-Facility Location game on the line. Thus, our results demonstrate that the Facility
Location game allows for some significantly (even exponentially) better approximation
guarantees (by non-imposing strategyproof mechanisms) than the k-Facility Location
game, and may suggest a potential connection between approximate mechanism design
without money and online optimization.
We also consider (randomized) oblivious winner-imposing mechanisms, and derive
a natural condition for them to be strategyproof. A mechanism is oblivious if condi-
tional on the event that an agent is not allocated a facility, her presence has no impact on
the mechanism’s outcome. The Proportional Mechanism and Meyerson’s algorithm are
oblivious. We show that an oblivious winner-imposing mechanism for the (k-)Facility
Location game on a continuous metric space is strategyproof iff it is locally strate-
gyproof, i.e., no agent can benefit by reporting a location arbitrarily close to her true
location (cf. Lemma 3). On the other hand, we note that local strategyproofness does
not imply strategyproofness for the non-imposing version of Meyerson’s algorithm.
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2 Model, Definitions, and Notation
For an integer m ≥ 1, we let [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. For an event E in a sample space, we
let IPr[E] be the probability of E happening. For a random variable X , we let IE[X] be
the expectation of X .
We assume an underlying metric space (M,d), where d :M ×M 7→ IR is the dis-
tance function, which is non-negative, symmetric, and satisfies the triangle inequality.
For x ∈M and a non-empty M ′ ⊆M , we let d(x,M ′) = inf{d(x, y) : y ∈M ′}. For
a location x ∈ M and a positive real r, we let Ball(x, r) = {y ∈ M : d(x, y) ≤ r}.
A metric space (M,d) is continuous if for any x, y ∈ M with d(x, y) ≤ 2r, there is a
z ∈ Ball(x, r) ∩ Ball(y, r) such that d(x, y) = d(x, z) + d(z, y).
For a tuple x = (x1, . . . , xn), we let x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) be the tu-
ple without xi. For a non-empty S ⊂ [n], we let xS = (xi)i∈S and x−S = (xi)i∈[n]\S .
We write x = (xi,x−i) and x = (xS ,x−S).
Mechanisms. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents. Each agent i ∈ N has a location
xi ∈ M , which is i’s private information. Next we refer to x = (x1, . . . , xn) as the
location profile. A deterministic mechanism F maps a location profile x to a tuple
of non-empty sets (C,C1, . . . Cn), where C ⊆ M is the facility set of F and each
Ci ⊆ C contains the facilities where agent i should connect. We write F (x) to denote
the facility set of F and F i(x) to denote the facility subset of each agent i. For the
k-Facility Location game, |F (x)| = k, while for the Facility Location game, |F (x)|
can be any positive number. A randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over
deterministic mechanisms.
A mechanism F is non-imposing if for all location profiles x and all agents i,
F i(x) = F (x), and imposing otherwise. We only consider imposing mechanisms
where each agent i can connect to the facility in F (x) closest to her reported location,
namely where {z ∈ F (x) : d(xi, z) = d(xi, F (x))} ⊆ F i(x) for all i. A mecha-
nism F is said to allocate facilities to the agents2 if F (x) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}. A mech-
anism F that allocates facilities to the agents is winner-imposing if for every agent i,
F i(x) = {xi} if xi ∈ F (x), and F i(x) = F (x) otherwise. For a winner-imposing
mechanism F and some location profile x, we write either that F allocates a facility
to agent i or that F places a facility at xi to denote that F adds xi in its facility set
F (x). Moreover, we write that F connects agent i to the facility at xi to denote that
F i(x) = {xi}, as a result of xi ∈ F (x).
Individual and Social Cost. Given a deterministic mechanism F and a location profile
x, the cost of agent i is cost[xi, F (x)] = d(xi, F i(x)). If F is a randomized mecha-
nism, the expected cost of agent i is cost[xi, F (x)] = IECi∼F i(x)[d(xi, Ci)].
The social cost for the k-Facility Location game of a deterministic mechanism F
for a location profile x is SCk[F (x)] =
∑n
i=1 d(xi, F (x)), subject to the constraint
that |F (x)| = k. For the Facility Location game, there is a uniform facility opening
cost f > 0, and the social cost of a deterministic mechanism F for a location profile
2 To simplify and unify the presentation, we implicitly assume here that all locations xi are
distinct. This assumption does not affect the generality of our model and our results, and can
be removed by letting the mechanism map each location profile to a tuple (C,C1, . . . Cn),
with C ⊆ N and Ci ⊆ C, Ci 6= ∅, and place a facility at xi for each i ∈ C.
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x is SC[F (x)] = f |F (x)| +∑ni=1 d(xi, F (x)). Scaling the distances appropriately,
we assume that the facility opening cost is equal to 1. The expected social cost of a
randomized mechanism F for a location profile x is defined by taking the expectation
of SCk[F (x)] (resp. SC[F (x)]) over the distribution of F (x).
A (randomized) mechanism F achieves an approximation ratio of ρ ≥ 1, if for
all location profiles x, the (resp. expected) social cost of F (x) is at most ρ times the
optimal social cost for x.
Strategyproofness and Group Strategyproofness. A mechanism F is strategyproof
if for any location profile x, any agent i, and any location y, cost[xi, F (x)] ≤
cost[xi, F (y,x−i)]. A mechanism F is group strategyproof if for any location pro-
file x, any non-empty set of agents S, and any location profile yS for them, there exists
some agent i ∈ S such that cost[xi, F (x)] ≤ cost[xi, F (yS ,x−S)].
3 The Winner-Imposing Proportional Mechanism
We consider the winner-imposing version of the Proportional Mechanism [10] for the
k-Facility Location game. Given a location profile x = (xi)i∈N , the Winner-Imposing
Proportional Mechanism, or WIProp in short, works in k rounds, fixing the location of
one facility in each round. For each ` = 1, . . . , k, let C` be the set of the first ` facilities
of WIProp. Initially, C0 = ∅. WIProp proceeds as follows:
1st Round: WIProp selects i1 uniformly at random from N , places the first facility at
xi1 , connects agent i1 to it, and lets C1 = {xi1}.
`-th Round, ` = 2, . . . , k : WIProp selects i` ∈ N with probability d(xi` ,C`−1)∑
i∈N d(xi,C`−1)
,
places the `-th facility at xi` , connects agent i` to it, and lets C` = C`−1 ∪ {xi`}.
The output of the mechanism isCk, and every agent not allocated a facility is connected
to the facility in Ck closest to her true location. The proof of the following theorem
follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 below.
Theorem 1. WIProp is a strategyproof 4k-approximation mechanism for the k-
Facility Location game on any metric space.
Strategyproofness. Even though the non-imposing version of the Proportional Mecha-
nism is not strategyproof for k ≥ 3 [10], WIProp is strategyproof for any k.
Lemma 1. For any k ≥ 1, WIProp is a strategyproof mechanism for the k-Facility
Location game.
Proof. For each ` = 0, 1, . . . , k, we let cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|C`] be the expected connec-
tion cost of an agent i at the end of WIProp, given that i reports location y and that the
facility set of WIProp at the end of round ` is C`. For ` = k, cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|Ck] =
d(xi, Ck). For each ` = 1, . . . , k− 1, with probability proportional to d(y, C`) the next
facility of WIProp is placed at i’s reported location, in which case i is connected to y
and incurs a connection cost of d(xi, y), while for each agent j 6= i, with probability
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proportional to d(xj , C`) the next facility of WIProp is placed at xj , in which case the
expected connection cost of i is cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|C` ∪ {xj}]. Therefore:
cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|C`] =
=
d(xi, y) d(y, C`) +
∑
j 6=i d(xj , C`) cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|C` ∪ {xj}]
d(y, C`) +
∑
j 6=i d(xj , C`)
(1)
Similarly, for ` = 0, the expected connection cost of agent i is:
cost[xi, F (y,x−i)] =
d(xi, y) +
∑
j 6=i cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|{xj}]
n
(2)
By induction on `, we show that for any y, any ` = 0, 1, . . . , k, and any C`,
cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|C`] ≥ cost[xi, F (x)|C`] (3)
Thus agent i has no incentive to misreport her location, which implies the lemma.
For the basis, we observe that (3) holds for ` = k. Indeed, if i’s location is not in
Ck, her connection cost is d(xi, Ck) and does not depend on her reported location y,
while if i’s location is in Ck her connection cost is d(xi, y) ≥ d(xi, xi). We inductively
assume that (3) holds for `+ 1 and any facility set C`+1, and show that (3) holds for `
and any facility set C`. If ` ≥ 1, we use (1) and obtain that:
cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|C`] ≥
≥ d(xi, y) d(y, C`) +
∑
j 6=i d(xj , C`) cost[xi, F (x)|C` ∪ {xj}]
d(y, C`) +
∑
j 6=i d(xj , C`)
=
d(xi, y) d(y, C`) +
(
d(xi, C`) +
∑
j 6=i d(xj , C`)
)
cost[xi, F (x)|C`]
d(y, C`) +
∑
j 6=i d(xj , C`)
(4)
The inequality follows from (1) and the induction hypothesis. For the equality, we apply
(1) with y = xi. If d(xi, C`) ≥ d(y, C`), (4) implies that cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|C`] ≥
cost[xi, F (x)|C`]. Otherwise, we continue from (4) and obtain that:
cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|C`] ≥
d(xi, y) + d(xi, C`) +
∑
j 6=i d(xj , C`)
d(y, C`) +
∑
j 6=i d(xj , C`)
cost[xi, F (x)|C`]
≥ cost[xi, F (x)|C`]
For the first inequality, we use that d(y, C`) > d(xi, C`) ≥ cost[xi, F (x)|C`]. For the
second inequality, we use that d(xi, y) + d(xi, C`) ≥ d(y, C`).
If ` = 0, using (2) and the induction hypothesis, we obtain that:
cost[xi, F (y,x−i)] ≥ 1
n
∑
j 6=i
cost[xi, F (x)|{xj}] = cost[xi, F (x)] (5)
Thus we have established (3) for any location y, any ` = 0, 1, . . . , k, and any C`. uunionsq
Approximation Ratio. To establish the approximation ratio, we extend the ideas of
[10, Theorem 4.2] to the case where k ≥ 3.
Lemma 2. For any k ≥ 1, WIProp achieves an approximation ratio of at most 4k for
the k-Facility Location game.
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4 A Randomized Mechanism for Facility Location
Next we consider the winner-imposing version of Meyerson’s randomized algorithm
for Facility Location [13], and show that it is strategyproof. Meyerson’s algorithm, or
OFL in short, processes the agents one-by-one in a random order, and places a facility
at the location of each agent with probability equal to her distance to the nearest facility
divided by the facility opening cost (which we assume to be 1). For simplicity, we
assume that the agents are indexed according to the random permutation chosen by
OFL. Also we let Ci denote the facility set of OFL just after agent i is processed.
Formally, given the locations x = (xi)i∈N of a randomly permuted set of agents,
the (winner-imposing) OFL mechanism first places a facility at x1, connects agent 1 to
it, and lets C1 = {x1}. Then, for each i = 2, . . . , n, with probability d(xi, Ci−1), OFL
opens a facility at xi, connects agent i to it, and letsCi = Ci−1∪{xi}. Otherwise, OFL
lets Ci = Ci−1. The output of the mechanism is Cn, and every agent not allocated a
facility is connected to the facility in Cn closest to her true location.
Theorem 2. The winner-imposing version of OFL is a strategyproof 8-approximation
mechanism for the Facility Location game on any metric space.
Proof. The approximation ratio follows from [13, Theorem 2.1]. Next, we show that
the winner-imposing version of OFL is strategyproof for any permutation of agents.
Let i be any agent, and let xi be i’s true location. If i = 1 or d(xi, Ci−1) ≥ 1, OFL
places a facility at xi with certainty, so i has no incentive to lie about her location. So
we restrict our attention to the case where d(xi, Ci−1) < 1.
Let cost[xi, F (y, xi+1, . . . , xn)|C] be the expected connection cost of agent i at
the end of OFL, given that i reports location y, and that just before i’s location is
processed, the set of facilities is C. Similarly, let cost[xi, F (xi+1, . . . , xn)|C] be the
expected connection cost of agent i at the end of OFL, given that just after i’s location
is processed, the set of facilities is C. To establish the strategyproofness of OFL, we
have to show that for any agent i located at xi, for any location y, and for any Ci−1,
cost[xi, F (xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)|Ci−1] ≤ cost[xi, F (y, xi+1, . . . , xn)|Ci−1] (6)
Calculating i’s expected connection cost for xi and y, we obtain that (6) holds iff
(d(y, Ci−1)− d(xi, Ci−1)) cost[xi, F (xi+1, . . . , xn)|Ci−1] ≤ d(xi, y) d(y, Ci−1)
If d(y, Ci−1) ≤ d(xi, Ci−1), (6) holds because the lhs of the inequality above becomes
non-positive. Otherwise, (6) holds because d(y, Ci−1) − d(xi, Ci−1) ≤ d(xi, y) and
cost[xi, F (xi+1, . . . , xn)|Ci−1] ≤ d(xi, Ci−1) < d(y, Ci−1). uunionsq
Remark. The argument above fails to establish that the non-imposing version ofOFL is
strategyproof. This is demonstrated by a simple instance with n agents on the real line.
The first agent is located at −1/2, the second at 0, the third at 1/2− ε, for some small
ε > 0, and the remaining n− 3 agents are located at 0. For appropriately chosen n and
ε and the particular permutation, the second agent can improve her expected connection
cost in the non-imposing version of OFL by reporting 1/2. On the other hand, no agent
has an incentive to lie if the expectation of their connection cost is also taken over all
random agents’ permutations. Thus, our example does not exclude the possibility that
the non-imposing version of OFL is strategyproof for the Facility Location game. uunionsq
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5 Oblivious Winner-Imposing Mechanisms
Next we consider the class of oblivious winner-imposing mechanisms for (k-)Facility
Location, and show that they are strategyproof iff they are locally strategyproof.
A randomized mechanism F that allocates facilities to the agents is oblivious if for
any location profile x = (xi)i∈N , any agent i, and any location y (y may be xi),
cost[xi, F (y,x−i)|i 6∈ F (y,x−i)] = d(xi, F (x−i)) ,
where d(xi, F (x−i)) is the expected distance of xi to the nearest facility in F (x−i),
i.e., F ’s outcome on the locations of all agents other than i. Namely, F is oblivious if
conditional on the event that an agent i is not allocated a facility, her presence has no
impact on F ’s outcome. WIProp and OFL are oblivious mechanisms.
A mechanism F is locally strategyproof for the (k-)Facility Location game if there
exists an r > 0, such that for any location profile x = (xi)i∈N , any agent i, and any
y ∈ Ball(xi, r), cost[xi, F (x)] ≤ cost[xi, F (y,x−i)].
Lemma 3. LetF be an oblivious winner-imposing mechanism for (k-)Facility Location
on a continuous metric space. Then F is locally strategyproof iff it is strategyproof.
Proof. Clearly, any strategyproof mechanism is locally strategyproof. For the other di-
rection, let x = (xi)i∈N be any location profile. For any agent i and any location x,
we let p(x) = IPr[i ∈ F (x,x−i)] be the probability that i is allocated a facility by
F if she reports location x. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 2, we observe that F is
strategyproof iff for any agent i with true location xi and any location y,
p(y) (d(xi, F (x−i))− d(xi, y)) ≤ p(xi) d(xi, F (x−i)) (7)
We show that if F is locally strategyproof for some r > 0, (7) holds for any location y.
Let i be any agent. If r ≥ d(xi, F (x−i)), (7) holds for any location y, since any
y 6∈ Ball(xi, r) makes its lhs non-positive. Otherwise, we show that (7) holds for any
location y ∈ Ball(xi, 2r). Let y ∈ Ball(xi, 2r) \ Ball(xi, r). Since the metric space is
continuous, there is a z ∈ Ball(xi, r) ∩ Ball(y, r) with d(xi, y) = d(xi, z) + d(z, y).
If d(xi, y) ≥ d(xi, F (x−i)), (7) holds because its lhs is non-positive. Otherwise,
p(y) ≤ p(z) d(z, F (x−i))
d(z, F (x−i))− d(z, y)
≤ p(z) d(xi, F (x−i))− d(xi, z)
d(xi, F (x−i))− d(z, y)− d(xi, z)
= p(z)
d(xi, F (x−i))− d(xi, z)
d(xi, F (x−i))− d(xi, y)
≤ p(xi) d(xi, F (x−i))
d(xi, F (x−i))− d(xi, y)
For the first inequality, we use that F is locally strategyproof for r, and apply (7)
for locations z, y. For the first two inequalities, since d(xi, F (x−i)) > d(xi, y), we
have that d(z, F (x−i)) − d(z, y) > 0, that d(xi, F (x−i)) − d(xi, z) > 0, and that
d(xi, F (x−i))− d(z, y)− d(xi, z) > 0. For the last inequality, we use that F is locally
strategyproof for r, and apply (7) for locations xi, z. uunionsq
Remark. OFL is locally strategyproof for any permutation of agents and r equal to the
minimum distance separating two different locations. On the other hand, we presented
an instance where for certain permutations, the non-imposing version of OFL allows
an agent to improve her expected cost by misreporting her location. Thus local strate-
gyproofness does not imply strategyproofness for non-imposing OFL. uunionsq
10 Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos
6 A Deterministic Mechanism for Facility Location on the Line
We present a deterministic non-imposing group strategyproof O(log n)-approximate
mechanism for Facility Location on the real line. To simplify the presentation, we as-
sume that the facility opening cost is 1, and that the agents are located in IR+ = [0,∞).
The Line Partitioning mechanism, or LPart in short, is motivated by the online
algorithm of [2] for Facility Location on the plane. LPart assumes a hierarchical par-
titioning of [0,∞) with at most 1 + log2 n levels. The partitioning at level 0 consists
of intervals of length 1. Namely, for p = 0, 1, . . ., the p-th level-0 interval is [p, p+ 1).
Each level-` interval [p 2−`, (p+ 1)2−`), ` = 0, 1, . . . , blog2 nc − 1, is partitioned into
two disjoint level-(`+ 1) intervals of length 2−(`+1), namely [p 2−`, p 2−` + 2−(`+1))
and [p 2−` + 2−(`+1), (p + 1) 2−`). A level-0 interval is active if it includes the (re-
ported) location of at least one agent. A level-` interval, ` ≥ 1, is active if it includes
the locations of at least 2`+1 agents, and inactive otherwise. Intuitively, an interval is
active if it includes so many agents that the optimal solution opens a facility nearby.
LPart opens three facilities, two at the endpoints and one at the midpoint, of each
level-0 active interval, and one facility at the midpoint of each level-` active interval,
for each ` ≥ 1. In particular, for each level-0 active interval [p, p + 1), LPart opens
three facilities at p, at p+ 12 , and at p+1. For each ` ≥ 1 and each level-` active interval
[p 2−`, (p+1)2−`), LPart opens a facility at p 2−`+2−(`+1). LPart is non-imposing,
so each agent is connected to the open facility closest to her true location.
Theorem 3. LPart is a group strategyproof O(log n)-approximate mechanism for the
Facility Location game on the real line.
Proof. We start with some observations regarding the structure of the solution produced
by LPart. We observe that if an interval q is active, any interval containing q is active,
while if an interval q is inactive, any interval included in q is inactive as well. Moreover,
all level-blog2 nc intervals are inactive, since each of them contains less than 2blog2 nc+1
agents. So each agent is included in at least one active and at least one inactive interval.
In the following, each agent i is associated with the maximal (i.e., that of the smallest
level) inactive interval, denoted qi, that contains her true location. The maximal inactive
intervals qi, qj of two agents i, j either coincide with each other or are disjoint.
A simple induction shows that each active interval q has three open facilities, two at
its endpoints and one at its midpoint. Moreover, if an active level-` interval contains an
inactive level-(`+1) subinterval q′, q′ has two open facilities at its endpoints. Therefore,
the connection cost of each agent i is equal to the distance of her true location to the
nearest endpoint of her maximal inactive interval qi. Furthermore, i’s connection cost
is at least as large as the distance of her true location to the nearest endpoint of any
inactive interval containing her true location.
Group Strategyproofness. The above properties of LPart immediately imply that:
Lemma 4. LPart is group strategyproof.
Proof. Let S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, be any coalition of agents who misreport their locations so
as to improve their connection cost, and let xS = (xi)i∈S and yS = (yi)i∈S be the
profiles with their true and their misreported locations respectively. If for some agent i,
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i’s maximal inactive interval qi contains the same number of agents in LPart(xS ,x−S)
and in LPart(yS ,x−S), qi is inactive in LPart(yS ,x−S) as well, and i’s connection
cost does not improve. On the other hand, if qi contains more agents in LPart(yS ,x−S)
than in LPart(xS ,x−S), there are some agents in S whose maximal inactive interval is
disjoint to qi in LPart(xS ,x−S) and is included in qi in LPart(yS ,x−S). Therefore,
there is some agent j ∈ S whose maximal inactive interval qj contains less agents in
LPart(yS ,x−S) than in LPart(xS ,x−S). Thus qj is inactive in LPart(yS ,x−S) as
well, and j’s connection cost does not improve due to the deviation of S. uunionsq
Approximation Ratio. We proceed along the lines of [2, Theorem 1]. We first show
that the optimal solution has a facility close to each active interval.
Proposition 1. Let q = [p 2−`, (p+1)2−`) be an active level-` interval, for some ` ≥ 0.
Then, the optimal solution has a facility in [(p− 1)2−`, (p+ 2)2−`).
Proof. Let ql = [(p − 1)2−`, p 2−`) be the interval next to q on the left, let qr =
[(p+1)2−`, (p+2)2−`) be the interval next to q on the right, and let nq be the number
of agents in q. For sake of contradiction, we assume that the optimal solution does not
have a facility in ql ∪ q ∪ qr. Then the connection cost of the agents in q is greater than
nq2−`. If ` = 0, placing an optimal facility at the location of some agent in q costs 1
and decreases the connection cost of the agents in q to at most nq − 1. If ` ≥ 1, placing
an optimal facility at the midpoint of q decreases the connection cost of the agents in q
to at most nq2−(`+1). Since q is active and nq ≥ 2`+1 (nq ≥ 1 for ` = 0), the total cost
in the later case is less than the connection cost of the agents in q to a facility outside
ql ∪ q ∪ qr, a contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 5. LPart has an approximation ratio of O(log n).
Proof. Let k be the number of facilities in the optimal solution. By Proposition 1, there
are at most 3 active intervals per optimal facility at each level ` = 0, 1, . . . , blog nc −
1. The total facility cost for the three (neighboring) active level-0 intervals is 7, and
the facility cost for each active level-` interval, ` ≥ 1, is 1. Therefore, the number
of active intervals is at most 3k log2 n, and the total facility cost of LPart is at most
4k + 3k log2 n.
To bound the connection cost of LPart, we consider the set of maximal inactive
intervals that include the location of at least one agent (i.e., they are non-empty). This
accounts for the connection cost of all agents, since each agent i is associated with her
maximal inactive interval qi. Each maximal inactive interval q at level `, ` ≥ 1, contains
less than 2`+1 agents and has two facilities at its endpoints. Thus the total connection
cost for the agents in q is at most 2`+12−`/2 = 1. Furthermore, q is included in some
active level-(` − 1) interval. Thus, the total number of non-empty maximal inactive
intervals, and thus the total connection cost of LPart, is at most 6k log2 n. Overall, the
total cost of LPart is at most 4k+9k log2 n, i.e. O(log2 n) times the optimal cost. uunionsq
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